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Abstract 
There are often public calls to codify moral sentiments after failures 
to help others, and two recent tragedies have renewed interest in one’s 
legal duty to aid another. This Article examines the moral underpinnings 
and legitimacy of so-called “Bad Samaritan” laws—laws that criminalize 
failures to aid others in emergency situations. Part I examines the 
theoretical backdrop of duties imposed by Bad Samaritan laws, including 
their relationship with various moral duties to aid. This leads to the 
analysis in Part II, which examines two related questions that are raised 
when moving from moral to legal duties: First, on what ground does the 
state have the authority to dictate that one’s needs should be met in the 
way specified by a particular legal duty? Second, does a special 
relationship exist that legitimizes the establishment of such legal duties? 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider two recent tragedies. On July 21, 2017, French philosopher 
Anne Dufourmantelle was sunbathing at Pampelonne Beach, near St. 
Tropez, when she noticed two children struggling in the water.1 An 
orange flag on the beach had just been changed to red—indicating 
dangerous conditions—yet Dufourmantelle immediately entered the 
water to try to save the children.2 Although she drowned after being 
carried away in a strong current, a lifeguard eventually saved the two 
 
 * Luke William Hunt, J.D., Ph.D., Assistant Professor, University of Alabama, 
Department of Philosophy.  
 1. French philosopher Dufourmantelle drowns rescuing children, BBC NEWS (July 
24, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40703606 [https://perma.cc/9KK5-2UKF] 
(describing Dufourmantelle as having written “numerous essays on the importance of taking risks 
and the need to accept that exposure to any number of possible threats is a part of everyday life.”). 
 2. Id.  
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children.3 Most people would describe Dufourmantelle’s actions as 
heroic and deserving of the utmost moral praise. Yet many would also 
describe her act as supererogatory—in other words, one that is not 
morally required because it is beyond the call of duty. After all, most 
people do not always have the fortitude to rush into danger and face 
death—even when another’s life is hanging in the balance. But perhaps 
there is a middle ground—a less heroic action that one ought to take in 
these situations. Maybe dialing 9-1-1 would satisfy one’s duty, or 
ensuring that a lifeguard (if one is on hand) is aware of the emergency. 
Now consider a situation similar to the one that Dufourmantelle faced—
but that played out much differently. 
On July 9, 2017, five teenage boys watched Jamel Dunn drown in a 
pond in Florida.4 Rather than simply dial 9-1-1, the teens filmed Dunn’s 
drawn-out struggle in a two-minute long video on a cell phone.5 On the 
video, the teens laugh and taunt Dunn as he repeatedly screams for help 
and struggles to stay afloat.6 They did not report Dunn’s death to 
authorities—though they posted the video of his death on the internet—
and Dunn’s body was not pulled from the water for five days.7 The teens 
were not charged with failing to aid Dunn because—the state attorney’s 
office explained—there is no Florida law “that compels an individual to 
render, request or seek aid for a person in distress.”8 If there was no legal 
duty or obligation to aid Dunn, should there have been? Although many 
would consider it unreasonable for the law to require the level of heroism 
displayed by Dufourmantelle, should the teens have been required to at 
least aid Dunn by calling 9-1-1? But even if it is left at that minimal 
requirement, what is the moral basis and limit of such laws?9 One might 
attempt to answer these questions by examining the enactment of so-
 
 3. Id.  
 4. Ralph Ellis, Nick Valencia & Devon Sayers, Chief to Recommend Charges Against 
Florida Teens Who Recorded Drowning, CNN (July 22, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/ 
07/21/us/florida-teens-drowning-man/?iid=ob_lockedrail_topeditorial [https://perma.cc/9MHM-
UFSE]. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. However, the police chief indicated “that he will recommend that the state attorney 
prosecute the teens under a statute that requires a person with knowledge of a death to notify a 
medical examiner” (which would be a misdemeanor under that statute). Id. 
 9. A second, related question is the extent to which the omissions of the relevant parties 
caused Dunn’s death. I note only two general difficulties with this issue. First, if failures of action 
are to count as causes of events, then there seems to be no non-arbitrary way to restrict the scope 
of failures of action that are to be considered causes of events—in this case Dunn’s death. Second, 
the simple fact that the teens may have prevented Dunn’s death by calling 9-1-1 does not 
demonstrate that the many other events and circumstances involved in Dunn’s death were 
insufficient to cause his death. See Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 253–59 (1980), for a fuller account of these arguments.  
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called “Bad Samaritan” laws. Unlike “Good Samaritan” laws (which 
offer legal protection to one who provides reasonable assistance to 
another in need), Bad Samaritan laws make it a crime to fail to aid others 
in emergency situations when providing aid would be easy.10  
There are often public calls to codify our moral sentiments after tragic 
failures to help others.11 For example, during the aftermath of Hurricane 
Sandy, it was revealed that a young woman was refused aid from 
neighbors after rising water separated her from her two young children; 
her children were later found dead nearby.12 The event prompted one 
commentator in the New York Times to suggest that it would be 
appropriate to enact the following law: “Any person who knows that 
another is in imminent danger, or has sustained serious physical harm, 
and who fails to render reasonable assistance, shall be fined up to 
$5,000.00, imprisoned up to three months, or both.”13  More recently, 
legal scholars have argued that “certain witnesses who are not physically 
present at the scene of a crime [“Digital Age Samaritans”] should be held 
criminally accountable for failing to report specified violent offenses of 
which they are aware.”14 This Article examines the moral underpinnings 
and legitimacy of such laws.  
Ironically, I say little about the details of Bad Samaritan laws 
themselves because that is well-covered ground.15 Instead, Part I 
 
 10. A handful of states have Bad Samaritan laws. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, 
chapter 4 (1984) (discussed in this section), for more on legal duties to rescue.  Although this 
paper focuses upon Bad Samaritan (duty-to-rescue) laws, many states have passed duty-to-report 
statutes. Some of these statues are narrowly tailored (e.g., restricting the duty to report to violent 
crimes against children), while others are broader (e.g., the duty to report criminal activity 
generally). Many of these laws are based upon special relationships. Somewhat related, there is 
also “misprision of felony” (concealing one's knowledge of another's criminal activity to the 
authorities), which often requires active concealment. Of course, more broadly, it should be noted 
that the criminal law does not come close to complying with, say, Mill’s Harm Principle, e.g., 
harmless crimes might include inchoate crimes (attempt, conspiracy, solicitation), possession 
crimes, status crimes (public intoxication), and so on—though, there is, of course, debate about 
what qualifies as “harm.” 
 11. Faith Karimi, Teens who laughed and recorded a drowning man in his final moments 
won’t face charges, CNN (June 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/26/us/florida-teens-no-
charges-drowning-man/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZE8Y-VC95].  A friend of Dunn’s sister 
started a petition to change Florida law.  Id. 
 12. Jay Sterling Silver, Can the Law Make Us Be Decent, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/opinion/can-the-law-make-bad-samaritans-be-decent.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q4MF-ZWNS]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Zachary D. Kaufman, Digital Age Samaritans, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2021). 
 15. For example, A.D. Woozley addressed the potential problems with Bad Samaritan laws 
in a well-known article thirty-five years ago. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some 
Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1983); see also Alison McIntyre, Guilty 
Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 157 (1994) 
(discussed in this section). 
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examines the broader, theoretical backdrop of duties imposed by Bad 
Samaritan laws, including their relationship with various moral duties to 
aid.16 This leads to the analysis in Part II, which examines two related 
questions that are raised when moving from moral to legal duties: First, 
on what ground does the state have the authority to dictate that one’s 
needs should be met in the way specified by a particular legal duty?17 
Second, does a special relationship exist that justifies the establishment 
of such legal duties?18 The answers to these questions are of interest 
inasmuch as they shed light on the relationships among our actions, our 
laws, and the well-being of others.  
I.  RESCUE AND BENEFICENCE 
The list of positive moral duties owed by individual persons may 
include rescue, beneficence, and justice.19 This Article focuses on the 
relationship between the first two of these potential duties and how they 
are related to legal duties to aid: rescue, the duty to aid others in 
emergency situations, and beneficence, the duty to promote the well-
being of others.20 To be clear, then, I am interested in the state’s authority 
to compel one in one’s individual capacity to help another, not the state’s 
authority to address broader principles of justice that affect general 
welfare on an institutional level.  Accordingly, this paper would not apply 
to, say, state mandates requiring the populace to wear masks or get 
vaccinations to protect the general welfare during a public health 
emergency such as a pandemic—mandates that strike me as justified and 
legitimate given institutional demands of justice.  
The above tripartite conception of positive moral duties implies that 
rescue and beneficence are distinct. But as almost every undergraduate 
philosophy student knows, Peter Singer’s classic paper on the topic 
suggests that there are questions about whether duties of rescue and 
beneficence may be distinguished in nonarbitrary ways. These sorts of 
questions led Singer to the well-known conclusion that our positive moral 
duties are conceivably without limit. Whatever one might think of 
 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Luke William Hunt, The Global Ethics of Helping and Harming, 36.4 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 798 (2014), for an account of duties of rescue and beneficence in the international context. 
Positive moral duties typically mean that one is obliged to take some sort of step or action, rather 
than merely refrain from taking some sort of step or action (i.e., a negative duty).  
 20. The third potential positive duty, justice, is typically considered an institutional 
principle, such that an individual’s primary duty is to support just institutions. See JOHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 47 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2003). However, others have argued that if 
individuals have a duty to support just institutions, then they also have a duty to support the just 
ends those institutions strive to bring about. See, e.g., Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands 
of Justice, 27.4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 283 (1998). 
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Singer’s argument, the underlying questions are relevant with respect to 
any positive legal duties the state may impose to aid others in one’s 
individual capacity—though, as discussed in Part II, they are relevant in 
surprising ways.  
One of the core questions is whether there is a nonarbitrary way to 
draw the line between rescue and beneficence. If not, one would seem to 
be left with some untenable options, including: (1) drawing a line that 
reflects an arbitrary limit to our positive duties; (2) accepting that we have 
essentially unlimited positive duties; or (3) accepting that our positive 
duties are quite limited. There are several prominent theories—including 
one by Liam Murphy and one by Garrett Cullity—that have attempted to 
overcome the obstacle presented by the first option, namely locating a 
nonarbitrary limit to our duty of beneficence.21 To help motivate the 
problem, first consider the difficulties that arise when analyzing duties to 
rescue.  
A.  Rescue 
There is no shortage of literature on the question of rescue. The field 
is rife with colorful moral dilemmas, and a random sampling will likely 
include runaway trolley cars, drowning babies, and, in some variations, 
pools full of drowning babies, that are supposed to explain one’s moral 
duties.22 While these scenarios are instructive in making narrow points—
and while it is presumably not impossible that one will find oneself in a 
pool of drowning babies—there is a reasonable concern that 
philosophical analysis of these hypothetical situations does not accurately 
reflect the process by which one actually analyzes moral questions. One 
worry is that pondering only whether one has the duty to make a split 
second decision to switch a trolley car from a track with three people tied 
on it to a track with two people leads to the conclusion that our duties 
should be based simply on their ability to produce good consequences in 
even the most unlikely of situations.23 But as Dunn’s case illustrates, 
rescue is an important practical moral question even if most of us 
experience such situations rarely.  
Joel Feinberg’s comprehensive analysis of rescue in Harm to Others, 
which generally argues that there should be a legal duty to rescue, is an 
 
 21. Hunt, supra note 19, at 800 (considering these three options in the international context 
regarding the potential duties that affluent states owe to the distant needy).  
 22. See, e.g., Molly Crockett, The Trolley Problem: Would You Kill One Person to Save 
Many Others?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2016, 11:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/ 
head-quarters/2016/dec/12/the-trolley-problem-would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-many-others 
[https://perma.cc/33J7-XSA3]; Marko Milanovic, The Drowning Child, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 3, 
2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-drowning-child/ [https://perma.cc/8WGS-ZMY6]. 
 23. See TALBOT BREWER, THE RETRIEVAL OF ETHICS 69‒70 (2009), for an analysis of the 
potential problems with this way of approaching practical problems. 
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appropriate starting point.24 It is representative of a general problem in 
the project of distinguishing legal and moral duties of rescue from 
beneficence: drawing a line at the point at which one’s duty to rescue 
ends seems like an arbitrary affair. Feinberg’s argument is centered on 
the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and determinate and 
indeterminate persons, and their respective rights (imperfect duties lack 
determinate recipients with correlative rights, while perfect duties 
involve determinate recipients with correlative rights).25 The perfect duty 
to rescue a determinate person entails that the determinate person has a 
right to be rescued from harm.26  
Conversely, the imperfect duty to rescue indeterminate persons does 
not entail a right of indeterminate persons to be saved.27 So the teens 
mentioned earlier would presumably have a perfect duty to attempt to 
rescue (say, by calling 9-1-1) Dunn, a determinate recipient, who would 
presumably have a right to be rescued by the teens. But what if one 
encounters two determinate persons—two persons drowning in a pool, 
say—and is only capable of saving one? Feinberg seems to blur the 
perfect and the imperfect, and the determinate and the indeterminate, by 
arguing that one has an imperfect duty to rescue as many persons as 
possible.28 Moreover, each person has a right that the rescuer rescue as 
many as possible.29 
But if Feinberg relies on the perfect/imperfect duty dichotomy, a 
problem arises with the last point about imperfect duties and the rights of 
multiple determinate persons. In the case involving two determinate 
drowning persons—only one of whom may be saved—Feinberg seems to 
say that each drowning person does have a right: a right that the rescuer 
save one of them if it is only possible to save one. The problem is that 
this does not seem fundamentally unlike Feinberg’s claim that 
indeterminate persons do not have a right to be rescued; this is because 
the second, determinate drowning person (who cannot be saved) is 
analogous to one of the many indeterminate, distant needy (who cannot 
be saved), yet one has a right to be rescued and the other does not.30 
 
 24. FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 185–86. 
 25. Id. at 134. 
 26. Id. at 134. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 147. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See MICHAEL A. MENLOWE, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A DUTY TO RESCUE, 
THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 19–21 (1993), for a discussion of these 
problems in Feinberg’s argument. In any event, if Feinberg’s goal is to morally distinguish 
determinate sets (e.g., of babies) from non-determinate sets (e.g., the distant needy), then it would 
perhaps be more plausible to argue that one has a perfect duty to use one’s discretion to choose 
who to save in a determinate set, while saving as many as possible. Each baby would thus have a 
right against a rescuer that the rescuer select and maximize, not a right to be saved. I will suggest 
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Why is this so? Here, one may ask to what extent there are factual 
differences between the duty to rescue as many drowning persons as 
possible and the duty (or lack thereof) to rescue as many of the distant 
needy as possible. Of course, there are many factual differences between 
the two cases, including: (A) physical distance, (B) experiential impact, 
(C) multiple potential rescuers, and (D) causal nature of aid.31 However, 
the important question is the extent to which these factual differences are 
different in a relevant way.  
Through a great many colorful examples, Peter Unger has argued that 
these and other factual differences are not morally relevant to our duty to 
rescue the distant needy.32 They can be summed up in a more general way 
by treating differences such as (A) and (B) similarly and differences such 
as (C) and (D) similarly. Regarding (A) and (B), sending $100.00 in the 
mail to help a dying child over 8,000 miles away obviously has a different 
experiential impact from pulling a drowning baby from a pool. What is 
less obvious is how this is relevant. The dying child 8,000 miles away is 
no less real, and, presumably, one could take a flight to a distant land, 
make one’s way to an Oxfam station (or some other effective 
organization), contribute $100.00 in person, and experience first-hand the 
rescue of a dying child. It just so happens that it would be much more 
efficient, and equally effective, to send the $100.00 in the mail.  
The factual differences represented by (C) and (D) have to do with, 
respectively, the impersonal nature of aiding the distant needy because 
there are a great many rescuers (all the affluent people in the world) and 
there are a great many needy persons (all the many distant needy dying 
around world). However, consider how Dunn’s case illustrates (C): You 
and four friends are relaxing by a pond and notice a man drowning. 
Assume each of your friends is able to rescue the man easily (by calling 
9-1-1, for example), but they do not do so for various reasons. It is 
difficult to see how your duty to rescue the man is affected by the fact 
that many others are able to do so.  
This seems to be roughly analogous to our situation with respect to 
the distant needy. The fact that there are many others who could send 
money to the distant needy does not seem to affect my duty to do so. 
Conversely, the circumstances represented by (D) illustrate how the sheer 
volume of those in need make it difficult to see how one’s meager 
$100.00 has any real causal impact. For instance, it is impossible to say 
that one’s $100.00 donation to Oxfam makes a difference to some 
particular, identifiable child in a distant country. It is certainly true that 
 
that such moves do not address whether determinate sets are morally different from indeterminate 
sets.  
 31. See PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH & LETTING DIE 33–49 (1996), for a description of these 
and other factual differences between cases of rescue and distant aid. 
 32. Id. 
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one’s $100.00 donation is a mere drop in the bucket of the millions of 
other donations, which permit lives to be saved collectively. However, as 
Unger puts it, it is difficult to see how there is any moral relevance “to 
the precise character of the causal relations between the well-off and 
those whom, whether collectively or not, they might help save.”33 In a 
sense, then, need and necessity are the ends of the stories in cases of both 
rescue and beneficence.34 
In spite of Feinberg’s complex analysis of duties and rights, we seem 
to be left where we started, namely, questioning the extent to which there 
is a moral duty to rescue and whether there is any nonarbitrary way to 
distinguish such a duty from the duty to help the distant needy (or a duty 
of beneficence). To be sure, Feinberg’s argument seems to suggest that 
we have a duty to rescue as many people as we are able—at least if they 
are drowning in a swimming pool in front of us—because those people 
have a right to be rescued. But if we have a duty to rescue as many 
people—whether in a swimming pool or otherwise—as we are able, and 
there is no relevant difference between those in the pool and those in 
distant lands, we need a more expansive theory regarding duties of 
beneficence. 
B.  Beneficence 
Dunn’s case illustrates the move to beneficence. Assuming that a 
simple call to 9-1-1 could have saved Dunn (seeing as he struggled in the 
pond for minutes), and assuming that the teens had a moral duty to rescue 
Dunn in this way, do the teens have the same moral duty to save a dying 
child in a distant land by simply mailing a $100.00 check to Oxfam?35 
And there is certainly more than one starving child, which raises the 
question of whether the teens should send a second $100.00 check, and 
third, and so on, especially if it only means that they will have less 
disposable income to purchase “weed” (which the teens admitted to 
smoking around the time Dunn drowned).36  
One might argue that the Dunn case is not an appropriate example 
because it would have been difficult for the teens to know with certainty 
that Dunn—an adult—would die as a result of them not calling 9-1-1 
 
 33. Id. at 49. 
 34. Feinberg and others would still want to say that determinateness adds something 
morally significant to rescue situations. There is clearly something factually different in cases 
when there is a determinate rescuer and rescuee, but, following Unger, it remains unclear what 
the moral difference is exactly. Perhaps there is a special relationship between determinate 
rescuers and rescuees—similar to familial or contractual relationships—that precludes the distant 
needy from possessing rights. I would submit that the nature of rescue relationships seems 
inherently different than the sorts of special relationships that will be discussed in Part II. 
 35. Karimi, supra note 11. 
 36. Id. 
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(notwithstanding the fact that they taunted him in the video, saying that 
he was going to die).37 That said, the teens would have known at least 
two facts: (1) Dunn’s interests were in jeopardy such that he was in need 
of assistance, and (2) it was necessary to take easy steps in order to 
attempt to meet Dunn’s need. Similarly, in the case of beneficence, one 
knows there are persons in distant countries with vital needs. The 
identities of these persons and precise nature of their needs are not 
known, but one is quite sure that there are options that may meet the needs 
of these persons, including sending $100.00 to Oxfam. One does not 
know exactly how this contribution will help and so—as in Dunn’s 
case—one is only left with certain basic facts: someone is in need, and 
one can either act or not act upon the various options at one’s disposal in 
an attempt to address those needs. 
But there are many people in need. And if the distinction between 
cases of rescue and cases of beneficence are artificial, then our duties are 
very extreme indeed. Based in part on the following two principles, this 
is of course the point that Singer made over forty years ago: (1) “Suffering 
and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad,” and (2) 
“[i]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it.”38 Accordingly, if one sees a child drowning in a 
shallow pond, one ought to pull the child out even if doing so means one’s 
clothes will get muddy, which is insignificant when compared to the 
death of the child. And for reasons similar to the ones that have been 
noted (geographic distance, multiple potential rescuers, etc.), Singer 
argues that his two principles apply to helping the distant needy in the 
same way they apply to rescuing the child in the pond: We are morally 
required to give a great deal of our time, money, and resources to things 
such as famine relief, rather than spending it on “trivia.”39 It would be an 
understatement to say Singer’s paper generated a great deal of 
disagreement regarding one’s duty to help the distant needy.40 The 
disagreement may be distilled to the following concern: Although there 
might be some duty to help the distant needy, there should be some 
practical way to limit that duty such that one is not reduced to a state of 
near poverty.41  
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 231 (1972) 
(providing an alternative, weaker version of the argument by removing “comparable” from the 
second premise).  
 39. Id. at 241. 
 40. See generally John Arthur, Rights and the Duty to Bring Aid, in WORLD HUNGER AND 
MORAL OBLIGATION 37 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1977) (responding to Singer’s 
position). 
 41. See Hunt, supra note 19, at 807 (making these points about Singer’s paper as they relate 
to duties owed by affluent states to peoples in other states). 
364 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31 
 
Liam Murphy addressed this concern with a comprehensive theory he 
calls the “collective principle of beneficence,” which attempts to make 
sense of the extreme demands required by the utilitarianism represented 
in Singer’s argument.42 From the outset, Murphy suggests that the 
demands of utilitarianism are extreme only because we view them in 
terms of the partial compliance of others.43 In other words, our duty to 
help others seems so extreme because most people do not comply with 
their duty to help others.44 If everyone did their fair share in aiding the 
needy, then the demands on each one of us would be reduced 
drastically.45 This failure of others to comply with their duty is the basis 
of Murphy’s theory, which accounts for the failure with a “compliance 
condition.”46 The compliance condition states that one’s duty of 
beneficence should not exceed one’s duty under conditions in which 
everyone else complied fully with their duty of beneficence.47  
The condition implies that the real problem with utilitarianism is not 
that it is overly demanding, but rather that it does not treat all persons as 
rational agents who are capable of performing their duty.48 Although 
utilitarianism typically disregards those who do not comply with their 
duty (almost as if they do not exist), the compliance condition affirms 
that non-compliers are agents who are assigned a certain portion of the 
work of beneficence.49 Moreover, one does not have to pick up their 
slack, so to speak, by performing the portion of work they are failing to 
perform. The final formulation of Murphy’s theory is lengthy and 
complex, but I take the key points to be as follows: 
(1) Everyone has a duty to take actions that will 
optimize aggregate well-being. 
(2) However, in circumstances in which everyone does 
not comply with (1), one is not required to sacrifice more 
than one would have to sacrifice under circumstances in 
which everyone did comply with (1). 
(3) Therefore, in circumstances in which everyone does 
not comply with (1), one has a duty to take actions—
 
 42. LIAM B. MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY 5–6 (2000). See also Hunt, 
supra note 19, at 810 (summarizing Murphy’s work using a similar analysis to address the extent 
to which affluent states owe duties of rescue and beneficence to the needs of those in other states).  
 43. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 117. 
 44. Hunt, supra note 19, at 810. 
 45. Id. 
 46. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 97–101. See also Hunt, supra note 19, at 810. 
 47. Hunt, supra note 19, at 810. 
 48. MURPHY, supra note 42, at 9–13. 
 49. Id. 
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within the parameters of (2)—that will optimize 
aggregate well-being.50 
This is a compelling theory, but there are two potential problems with 
the collective principle of beneficence. First, Murphy’s theory does not 
seem adequate unless one adds several rules and prohibitions. For 
example, if one’s individual duty is limited by (2) above, and one 
complies with (3) above, then what happens if one subsequently 
encounters a person drowning in a pool—or sees someone in need of a 
simple call to 9-1-1, such as Dunn? If one has already completed one’s 
duty in (3), then one is under no obligation to take additional actions to 
help others—regardless of whether those others are 8,000 miles away or 
face-to-face. Conversely, people who are very bad off would seem to be 
completely off the hook when it comes to rescuing others. Because the 
very poor are already the worst off in society, their status may preclude 
them from being factored into the collective calculus of sacrifice 
allotments. It is unclear exactly how the collective principle of 
beneficence would cultivate a duty to rescue in such cases. Murphy 
acknowledges that we may have to think of rescue as simply a good rule 
of thumb. Unfortunately, this leads one back to Singer’s position that 
there is no sensible reason to react differently to cases of rescue and 
beneficence, ultimately leaving the collective principle of beneficence as 
a somewhat arbitrary limitation of the duty of beneficence.51  
Garrett Cullity attempted to address some of these problems in The 
Moral Demands of Affluence. Indeed, his theory is said to provide the 
basis for a nonarbitrary limitation to the duty of beneficence. Rather than 
base the limitation on the notion of one’s fair share of a collective duty, 
Cullity proposes an “aggregate approach.” Cullity suggests that one is 
excused from the duty of beneficence when the aggregate cost of one’s 
successive contributions of beneficence reaches a certain point.52 By 
rejecting the extreme demands of beneficence and embracing an 
aggregate approach, Cullity gives us the following account of 
beneficence: one has a duty to give aggregately until going further would 
worsen one’s life by a “requirement-grounding amount” (the sort of 
 
 50. Id. at 117. 
 51. Despite its limitations, the collective principle of beneficence is of course an impressive 
theory for dealing with the extreme demands of utilitarianism because it shifts the burden of 
beneficence to a collective unit. It seems reasonable to ground institutional and collective 
principles in our ethical intuitions, but when those principles are reduced to individual experiences 
it is unclear how exactly they apply to each one of us. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE 
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 102–03 (1985), for an analysis of how institutional theories ultimately lead 
“back to the original, Kantian, universalistic concerns of such a theory.”  
 52. GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE 82 (2004). In taking this 
approach, Cullity rejects both the “severe demand” and the “extreme demand” of beneficence (the 
former is the general view that our duty of beneficence is very demanding, as represented by 
Singer). Id. at 70–82. 
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goods in which one is justified in having an interest because they would 
not preclude one from helping a person simply because that person has 
an interest in such goods)53 with the caveats that one may (1) live a “non-
altruistically directed life” (one that does not comply with the extreme 
demands of a life-altering duty of beneficence) and (2) seek “commitment 
goods” (e.g., personal relationships, worthwhile personal projects)54 
within that life.55  
How is one justified in living a life that rejects the extreme demands 
of beneficence to which Singer and others have alerted us? Cullity argues 
that one’s right to live a non-altruistic life is based upon the fact that other 
people’s interests in the fulfillment of a non-altruistic life provide us with 
morally compelling reasons to help them.56 In other words, almost no one 
complies with the extreme demand of beneficence, and the morally 
compelling reason to help other people does not disappear just because 
they do not live altruistically focused lives in the way the extreme demand 
would require. For Cullity, then, it follows that it must be morally 
permissible for each one of us to likewise pursue such a life, and the outer 
limit of the duty of beneficence is thus the point at which one can no 
longer live such a life.57  
Cullity acknowledges that there is no general way to apply his theory 
to everyone because the interests of each person vary, as do the things 
one considers life-enhancing.58 One person may have requirement-
grounding goods (friendships, aptitudes, and so on) that are more 
expensive than another person’s requirement-grounding goods, thus 
justifying a more expensive lifestyle.59 Although it seems right to say that 
the goods that are important to people, as well as the costs of those goods, 
vary a great deal, it is difficult to say exactly how this should affect one’s 
duty of beneficence. Cullity attempts to address the subjectivity of this 
question by providing some practical examples regarding how one should 
generally spend one’s money (for instance, some expensive purchases 
should be considered morally indefensible, such as a car or books for a 
private library, though expensive tertiary education might be morally 
defensible because it is life-enhancing).60 
The problem is not that the implications of Cullity’s theory appear 
puritanical (many seem perfectly reasonable), but rather that the sorts of 
intuitions underlying the theory can seem to approach the status quo. 
 
 53. Id. at 150–51. 
 54. Id. at 162–63. 
 55. Id. at 203. 
 56. Id. at 133–36. 
 57. CULLITY, supra note 52, at 146. 
 58. Id. at 180. 
 59. Id. at 181. 
 60. Id. at 180–83. 
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There is an underlying concern that the approach permits affluent people 
to more or less continue living as they currently do, while being more 
conservative in their spending on certain (superficial) items. Moreover, 
one reaches an impasse if there are disagreements regarding another’s 
fundamental conception of what is “life enhancing,” or which goods are 
morally indefensible. To put it another way, the aggregate approach 
seems to obscure what it means to say one has a duty to do or not do 
something. In some sense, then, the aggregate approach—like the 
collective principle of beneficence—can seem to permit one to continue 
acting the way one is accustomed to acting based upon one’s intuitions.61 
II.  FROM MORAL DUTIES TO LEGAL DUTIES 
Given the limits of Murphy’s and Cullity’s (otherwise compelling) 
theories to constrain duties of beneficence, this part of the Article 
considers a variation of the third option presented at the outset: the idea 
that we have limited moral duties that legitimize positive legal duties. In 
other words, if the distinction between a duty of rescue and a duty of 
beneficence is in some sense arbitrary, and if the noted theories fail to 
limit a duty of beneficence in a nonarbitrary way, then the state is 
constrained in imposing legal duties to aid others in one’s individual 
capacity (e.g., via Bad Samaritan Laws) without some principled, 
independent basis of authority to do so.62 Of course, this does not mean 
that we have few positive moral duties (this Article takes no position on 
the extent and basis of one’s positive moral duties, aside from suggesting 
that the above theories do not establish clear limits on a duty of 
beneficence), but rather that we have somewhat limited positive moral 
duties that legitimize positive legal duties in one’s individual capacity. 
This position is in some sense similar to the argument in political 
philosophy that one does not have a moral duty to obey the law simply 
because a need or necessity exists. Rather, a moral duty to obey the law 
must be based upon the state’s legitimacy with respect to the law—even 
though one may have an independent moral duty to meet a need with 
 
 61. It should again be noted that neither Murphy’s nor Cullity’s theories explicitly account 
for the problem of rescue. While Murphy relies on “agents’ motives and character” in rescue 
cases, Cullity states the following regarding encountering a rescue situation in which one’s 
aggregate duty had already been met: “I could save the person’s life and then, if it costs me 
anything, take that into account as part of my overall budget for contributing to saving the lives 
of strangers; or I could let the person die, and spend the whole of that budget on donations to aid 
agencies.” Cullity suggests that the former option would be morally right because failures of 
rescue are more blameworthy in that they are more “vividly inescapable.” MURPHY, supra note 
42, at 132; CULLITY, supra note 52, at 200. Both Murphy and Cullity’s solutions seem to be 
cloaked ways of saying simply that we have good reasons to rescue people. 
 62. I take the second option—the view that we have essentially unlimited positive duties—
to be some form of unrestrained utilitarianism. That option will not be addressed. 
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which a law is concerned.63 The position here is that contingent claims of 
need in cases of rescue and beneficence do not necessarily give rise to 
legitimate legal duties to meet those claims of need (though they might). 
Rather, the idea is that any legitimate legal requirement to aid others must 
be based upon the state’s claim of authority to impose such requirements. 
Evaluating the legitimacy of Bad Samaritan Laws can thus be addressed 
in part by answering the following related questions: (1) On what ground 
does a state have the authority to dictate that one’s needs should be met 
in the way specified by a particular legal duty? (2) Does a special 
relationship exist that authorizes the establishment of such legal duties? 
The first question has to do with the state’s authority to enact duties 
to aid others. Even if everyone agrees that such laws are justified, 
intrinsically and instrumentally superior to alternative arrangements, that 
does not necessarily answer the question about the state’s authority to 
impose them. One way to answer the first question is to say that the state 
must have authority in virtue of its legitimacy—the moral right to 
command (and have its command obeyed) that one’s needs should be met 
in the way specified by a legal duty.64 There are multiple accounts 
regarding why a state might have this sort of authority.  
Roughly, one might categorize accounts of legitimacy and their 
correlative duties to obey the law as transactional, natural, or 
associative.65 Transactional accounts are based upon our interactions with 
others and include theories based upon special obligations that arise from 
consent and general duties that arise from fairness (e.g., one has a general 
duty to the state in light of the benefits one receives from the state).66 
Natural duty theorists argue that just states are legitimate, and one has a 
moral duty to support just and good states because they are just and 
good.67 Finally, associative theories claim that states may subject persons 
 
 63. This issue was debated in CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN & A. JOHN SIMMONS, IS 
THERE A DUTY TO OBEY THE LAW? (2005) (Wellman argues that we have a duty to obey based 
upon “samaritanism,” which, roughly, includes two descriptive premises and one moral premise 
(the third premise): “(1) states secure vital benefits that (2) could not be secured by any other, 
non-coercive means….[and (3)] one’s normally decisive position of moral dominion can be 
overridden by particularly urgent, and therefore morally preemptory, concerns.” Id. at 23. In part 
II of the book, Simmons argues that samaritanism does not give rise to a moral duty to obey the 
law, and, here, I invoke Simmons’s view to show how positive moral duties to aid others 
legitimate limited legal duties to aid).   
 64. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, Justification and Legitimacy, in JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: 
ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 130 (2001), for an account of the distinction between a 
state’s justification and its legitimacy.  
 65. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS, ch. 3 (1979) 
and WELLMAN & SIMMONS, supra note 63, at part II, for an account of the weaknesses of each of 
these theories.  
 66. SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 63–64. 
 67. See PLATO, Crito, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS (John M. Cooper ed., 1997), for an early 
account of a natural duty theory (in which Socrates suggests that it would be wrong to disobey 
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to legitimate authority because states are the kinds of associations that 
generate obligations; this is analogous to a duty one might owe to one’s 
parent or sibling by virtue simply of occupying the duty–laden role of 
“son” or “brother.”68  
Each of these theories has significant–—though not necessarily 
conclusive—shortcomings. To be sure, these brief remarks do not scratch 
the surface of the voluminous work on legitimacy and authority.69 
Defending and justifying one theory or another is not this Article’s goal, 
but it is plausible to think that many liberal states in some sense embrace 
transactional theories based upon reciprocation and fairness: In the 
context of liberal societies, persons are often viewed as reciprocators who 
have a fair share of the collective labor. This means that persons are 
viewed as having a general duty to the collective because it would be 
wrong to reap the benefits of the collective as a free rider who takes 
advantage of others’ good faith compliance. The point is that 
reciprocation is presumed to be central to the ideal of the liberal state: 
Liberal states are just political societies based upon a collective enterprise 
in which persons do their part to keep it running.70 This is 
notwithstanding theoretical problems with the idea, including that some 
benefits provided by the collective may not have been accepted 
voluntarily or explicitly by all members of the collective (though perhaps 
many benefits are accepted tacitly).71 But this and other complaints about 
reciprocation do not undermine the fundamental role that reciprocation 
seems to play in liberal states. This is not a particularly controversial or 
dogmatic claim because the idea of reciprocation—in one form or 
another—is significant in the work of many liberal theorists who embrace 
pluralism.72  
This brief sketch of legitimacy does raise an important point about the 
extent to which states in the liberal tradition may dictate that one’s needs 
 
the law and flee Athens because he has a duty not to harm the state and the moral value of its 
Law).  
 68. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, ch. 2 (1986), for an account of associative 
theories.  
 69. The work on legitimacy and authority—not to mention “philosophical anarchism” and 
states’ illegitimacy—is voluminous. See, for example, SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 102–21, for an 
account of how problems with the various theories of legitimacy might lead one to philosophical 
anarchism. 
 70. There are of course many liberal philosophers who do not view reciprocation as the 
basis of legitimacy, but this does not mean that reciprocation is not a fundamental aspect of the 
liberal ideal.   
 71. See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 65, at 129. 
 72. See LUKE WILLIAM HUNT, THE RETRIEVAL OF LIBERALISM IN POLICING 29–30 (2019), 
in which I draw upon the work of a variety of liberal theorists to support the role of reciprocation 
in liberal states generally and liberal policing specifically. There, I note that “the ideal of the 
liberal state does not preclude the possibility that a state’s legitimacy could be based upon a 
combination of factors and theories in addition to reciprocation.” Id. at 55–56.   
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should be met in the way specified by a particular legal duty one has in 
one’s individual capacity (rather than the demands of justice in an 
institutional context). This is in part because each of the theories for 
legitimacy mentioned above—transactional, natural, and associative—
suggest that the state’s authority and power is limited. The limit might be 
based upon the extent to which the citizenry voluntarily divested power 
to the state, the contours of their associative relationship with the state, 
or the extent to which it would be fair for them to reciprocate in light of 
the benefits received from the state.  
The extent to which states are limited in these ways highlights a 
problem with Bad Samaritan Laws: Any limits placed upon such laws are 
in some sense arbitrary given the shortcomings of the earlier theories 
(from Part I) to distinguish between rescue and beneficence.73 If the state 
has the authority to compel people to engage in easy rescues in their 
individual capacity, then—given the shortcomings of the earlier 
theories—there is no nonarbitrary way to limit the state’s authority to 
enact laws that require one to engage in a great many other positive duties 
to meet the needs of others in one’s individual capacity.74 In a sense, then, 
Bad Samaritan Laws are conceivably without limits and indicative of 
unlimited state authority to compel individuals to “do good.” Of course, 
unlimited or arbitrarily limited authority is contrary to the fundamental 
principles of liberal states, which are presumably constrained by political 
norms such as the rule of law. A state with a dictate to oversee the moral 
character of all its citizens is akin to the ultra-paternalistic city-state 
illustrated in Plato’s Laws—a state in which “[t]he purpose of the law is 
not merely to protect one’s interests, but rather to make one better off in 
every respect. . . . to secure a good and virtuous life for the 
citizens . . . .”75 Although improving one’s moral character might seem 
like a good idea in principle, it is not typically construed as part of the 
mandate of liberal states.  
Consider further the analogy regarding the legal duty to aid others in 
one’s individual capacity and an argument for the moral duty to obey the 
law, namely, that the moral duty to obey the law is based upon the simple 
claim that human beings need government, which necessitates 
compliance with the law.76 For example, necessity arguments for obeying 
 
 73. See supra Part I. 
 74. I am not suggesting that such a legal requirement would be inconsistent with a moral 
duty to aid (we may very well have expansive moral duties to aid others beyond easy rescue 
situations), but rather that such legal requirements may be inconsistent with the state’s authority. 
Moreover, the issue here is the state’s authority to require duties of rescue and beneficence in 
one’s individual capacity. The state may very well have the authority to promote the general 
welfare of the polity based upon broader, institutional principles of justice.  
 75. Luke William Hunt, The Law in Plato’s Laws: A Reading of the ‘Classical Thesis’, 35 
POLIS 102, 124 (2018). 
 76. WELLMAN & SIMMONS, supra note 63, at 121. 
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the law are derived from natural moral duties, which A. John Simmons 
has described as grounded either “(a) in the moral importance of 
advancing some impartial moral good or (b) in some moral duty thought 
to be owed by all persons to all others as moral equals, regardless of roles, 
relationships, or transactions.”77 It is thus easy to see how a legal duty to 
aid others in one’s individual capacity may be compared with a necessity 
argument based upon this understanding of a natural duty.  
The intuitions involved in this sort of argument are similar to the ones 
that form the basis of a legal duty to rescue a drowning child, make a 9-
1-1 call, and so on. To put the analogy simply, other persons are our moral 
equals; they have certain biological needs, which necessitate and justify 
a legal duty to aid them. Although this is compelling from the perspective 
of one’s individual moral duties, such necessity accounts must show how 
the claims of those in need of aid authorize a governmental entity to 
dictate how those needs should be met legally by one in one’s individual 
capacity.  
In his critique of necessity claims for a duty to obey the law, Simmons 
argues that it is unclear how a person’s needs authorize another to dictate 
anything in particular about that need: “The fact that I am ill and hungry 
and need care does not on its face seem to give any other person or group 
authority to dictate to me (and/or others, absent my and/or their consent) 
in whatever ways are required to meet my need.”78 This point highlights 
a straightforward difference between moral and legal duties to aid: 
although a moral duty of rescue or beneficence might be described as a 
duty to offer aid to one in need, a legal duty to aid is based on 
governmental authority to compel one to meet the needs of another in a 
specific way.  
There is certainly a strong case that easy rescue situations involving 
life or death—particularly those in which there exist a determinate 
number of rescuers and rescuees—generate moral duties of aid.79 While 
it might seem intuitive to extend such moral duty to aid to a legal duty to 
aid, there must be a basis for the government’s authority to legally compel 
one to comply with one’s individual, positive moral duties (as opposed to 
addressing the broader principles of justice that affect general welfare on 
an institutional level).  
 
 77. Id. at 121. 
 78. Id. at 131. Simmons analyzes necessity accounts provided by Elizabeth Anscombe and 
Tony Honoré, who both support their positions with examples of family relationships. However, 
as Simmons notes, the intuitive correctness of these sorts of examples is based in large part on the 
traditional conviction that family members owe duties to each other. And while one might argue 
that there is similar intuitive force regarding claims that one has a duty to rescue another in an 
emergency situation, the intuition is much less powerful when extended to the distant needy. 
 79. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 287–88 (1980). 
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Alison McIntyre supports the intuition by arguing that one’s duty to 
perform easy rescues is based upon one’s public duty as a citizen, which 
is analogous to the public duties of law enforcement and other emergency 
services.80 For example, one’s community undertakes to protect property 
against damage from fire by providing fire departments.81 That said, it 
would be impractical for communities to appoint “fire monitors” with 
contractual duties to alert the fire department if they see signs of fire.82 
Instead, this public duty is left to the citizens in the same way firefighters 
perform public duties rather than private duties with respect to individuals 
whose houses need saving: “The state has a duty to protect the general 
welfare, and one way of carrying out this duty is to ‘deputize’ citizens to 
function as part of a monitoring system and, in circumstances in which 
assistance can be easily provided, as surrogates for professional 
rescuers.”83 Moreover, McIntyre argues, such emergency assistance 
“constitutes a reasonable and not excessively burdensome interference 
with individual liberty because it applies only to cases in which a fairly 
small effort is able to avert a very great harm and the threat arises out of 
exceptional circumstances.”84 So one violates a positive duty grounded 
in a public duty when one fails to perform an easy rescue. 
One worry about this argument is that it would also benefit the public 
if everyone refrained from eating fast food, smoking, and drinking 
alcohol because public health would be improved significantly, as would 
the strain on and cost of healthcare. But we do not say the government 
has the authority to legally compel one to volunteer at homeless shelters, 
donate to cancer research, eat healthily, or floss daily. There are 
innumerable needs in society for which there would be an interest in 
legally compelling others to meet, and it would of course be absurd to try 
to legally compel one to meet all such needs.  
One might object by suggesting that rescue is a particularly important 
public benefit. In other words, legally compelling one to easily rescue 
another in a life-or-death situation is of a profoundly different character 
than legally compelling one to maintain a healthy diet. However, legally 
compelling society to maintain a healthy diet would save vastly more 
lives—and vastly more money—than legally compelling society to 
provide easy rescue in the rare cases one finds oneself in such a situation. 
So, though it may sound odd, legally compelling one to maintain a 
healthy diet is arguably far more morally significant than legally 
compelling one to easily rescue another, at least to the extent one is 
 
 80. Alison McIntyre, Guilty Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 157, 181–82 (1994). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 181. 
 83. Id. at 181–82. 
 84. Id. at 182. 
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working within a utilitarian framework. Of course, many are unconvinced 
by utilitarian arguments because they fail to account for the moral 
significance of each person, as noted above. This leads to the second issue 
that must be examined in the context of legal duties to provide aid to 
others: special relationships.85 
There is good reason to think the state has authority to impose duties 
of aid with respect to special relationships, including because many states 
are themselves based upon special relationship theories (e.g., the 
contractual relationship in social contract theory). For instance, states in 
the liberal tradition are often viewed as a cooperative scheme in which 
persons cooperate to produce a morally and prudentially superior 
condition than the alternatives. By morally superior I mean that such a 
political community is justified inasmuch as it conceives of persons as 
free and equal rather than bound by unlimited state authority. Likewise, 
with respect to the community’s prudential superiority, I mean to describe 
how broadly defined theories in the social contract tradition claim that 
there are practical reasons for embracing a cooperative political 
community based upon reciprocity. In other words, schemes based upon 
reciprocity better preserve the conception of persons as free and equal, 
such as by enforcing negative duties and dealing with law-breaking. One 
can see this inasmuch as, say, Locke’s political theory is based upon the 
goal of eliminating inconveniences. A central component of this goal is 
collectively providing for security by centralizing the right to punish, to 
eliminate bias, and personal incapacity.  The upshot is that many 
government regulations in fact enhance liberty rather than restrict it.86  
CONCLUSION 
The above sketch of liberal and social contract theory highlights the 
role of special relationships within those theories. In the same way the 
 
 85. McIntyre’s argument draws out this point, namely, that there is a substantial gap 
between the way the law treats one who fails to rescue another with whom one has a special 
relationship and the way the law treats one who fails to rescue another with whom one has no 
relationship. The law can be quite strict in the case of the former, though quite lenient in the case 
of the latter (even if a Bad Samaritan law exists). This brings us back to the discussion of 
Feinberg’s determinateness in Part I. In other words, is there something morally significant about 
cases in which there is a determinate rescuer and rescuee? Does a special relationship exist 
between rescuer and rescuee that justifies a legal duty to provide aid? Even if the relationship 
between determinate rescuers and rescuees is more similar (than indeterminate rescue/beneficence 
situations) to familial, contractual, and professional emergency service relationships, I assume 
(based upon the shortcomings of the arguments to distinguish rescue and beneficence in Part I) 
that they are not sufficiently similar to justify many legal duties to aid. See generally id.  
 86. Or consider how Kant’s goal in political philosophy might be described broadly as 
making justice possible through omnilateral authorization.  IMMANUAL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS 
OF MORALS 30 (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). See also, HUNT, supra 
note 72, at 21, for discussion of these points. 
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state’s legitimacy may be based upon a special relationship (e.g., a 
transactional relationship based upon consent or reciprocation), the state 
has the limited authority to legally require one to meet the obligations 
derived from one’s special relationships with others. This could be, in 
part, based upon the state’s role of eliminating inconveniences noted 
above, which prevents one from having to enforce one’s agreements with 
others (or having to punish those who fail to honor their agreements). 
Although it would of course be difficult to identify exactly which special 
relationships—and the exact positive duties that exists within those 
relationships—the state has the authority to enforce, it is perhaps less 
difficult to identify the broad families of such relationships.  
A short list might include contractual relationships, certain familial 
relationships, and so-called “seclusion relationships” (situations in which 
one prevents another from receiving aid from others).87 So, for example, 
the state might have the authority to impose a legal duty to rescue those 
with whom one has a contractual relationship (e.g., a contract in which a 
caregiver agrees to meet the needs of one who is sick or disabled), a 
familial relationship (e.g., parents to their minor children),88 or a 
seclusion relationship (e.g., situations in which one has secluded the one 
needing aid so as to prevent others from giving aid). Although these 
families of special relationships are by no means exhaustive, they 
highlight the general ways in which a state might have the limited 
authority to compel one in one’s individual capacity to meet the needs of 
others. While these families of special relationships no doubt require 
exceptions and caveats, they provide a rough framework for grappling 
with questions about the legitimacy of laws that require one to rescue 
another in one’s individual capacity 
Interestingly, the three types of special relationships above track the 
three broad theories of a state’s legitimacy discussed earlier: (1) 
agreements to aid others track transactional theories of state legitimacy; 
(2) familial relationships that generate obligations track associative 
theories of state legitimacy; and (3) seclusion relationships track natural 
 
 87. Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (1962) (holding that there is no legal duty to rescue 
without a special relationship involving (1) a status relationship, such as parent to child; (2) a 
contractual duty of care; or (3) a seclusion relationship; of course, the court also held that legal 
duties to rescue exist when there is a statute requiring rescue (e.g., Bad Samaritan Laws)—the 
issue that this Article addresses).  
 88. For example, while Locke’s general position is that persons are born equally with a set 
of rights that allow them to govern themselves, minor children are not included among such 
persons. This is one reason (among others) that states in the liberal and social contract tradition 
might have the authority to require parents to aid their minor children. 
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duty theories of state legitimacy inasmuch as it would be just to aid those 
from whom one secludes others from aiding.89  
One might think that these three accounts of a state’s legitimacy 
would yield three different conclusions regarding the boundaries of state 
authority generally and the boundaries of Bad Samaritan laws 
particularly. This is an apt observation, but, as noted in the last section, 
one need not take a dogmatic approach with respect to theories about 
legitimacy and authority. In other words, it seems reasonable to think that 
a state’s legitimacy could be based upon a combination of factors and 
theories, such that different theories work in tandem to provide a more 
robust account of legitimacy with respect to a larger swath of people. And 
regardless of the theory of state legitimacy, there is an overlapping 
principle of limited state authority within liberal societies—and this 
principle suggests a shared boundary between different theories of state 
legitimacy that has implications regarding what can be legislated.90 
This raises the broader point of the relationship between state 
authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the arbitrariness of the 
distinction between duties of rescue and beneficence. If the theories of 
rescue discussed fail to limit a duty of beneficence in a nonarbitrary way, 
then the state may not legitimately impose legal duties to aid others in 
one’s individual capacity (e.g., via Bad Samaritan Laws) without some 
independent basis from within its (limited) authority. Otherwise, the state 
would in a sense have unlimited authority to impose legal duties to aid 
others. Of course, many state laws—not just Bad Samaritan Laws—
might involve arbitrary distinctions given the practical difficulty of line-
drawing. The legitimate limit of such other laws is a worthy topic of 
inquiry, but, here, the point is simply that Bad Samaritan laws raise 
unique questions given the fundamental nature of their mandate.  
 
 89. These categories are treated as broad families of relationships that lend support to state 
authority. This Article claims neither that these are the only ways that Bad Samaritan Laws are 
justified, nor that there are no limitations on Bad Samaritan Laws beyond those discussed herein. 
 90. It seems right to say that theories of legitimacy and authority (whether based upon 
transactional, associative, or natural duty theories) do not provide precise limits on the state’s 
authority—with respect to legislation or otherwise. For example, the content of one’s consent to 
authority is unlikely to be spelled out in significant detail; perhaps the clearest account of consent 
to authority would be that of the roughly 20 million naturalized citizens in the U.S. who took a 
specific oath to freely support and defend the Constitution, as well as a number of other 
commitments.  From a narrow, jurisprudential point of view, theories such as legal positivism 
(holding that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits or 
morality) cannot be regarded as sources of obligation to follow the law because that is ultimately 
a moral issue that brings us back to fundamental questions about political obligation.  See Scott 
J. Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in RONALD DWORKIN, 
ed. A. Ripstein (Cambridge, 2007), for an overview of these issues. The broader point is that 
liberal societies are based in part upon a general principle of limited authority that has implications 
regarding the boundaries of legislation.  
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This tentative conclusion should be tempered by the central role that 
reciprocation plays in liberal societies. To be sure, even if one assumed 
that individual liberty is the only value for which the government exists, 
a view with which this Article does not agree, there is not a strict inverse 
correlation between individual liberty and government regulation. 
Indeed, as noted above,91 many government regulations in fact enhance 
liberty rather than restrict it. More broadly, one of the values promoted 
by liberal states is what we might describe colloquially as “helping each 
other out” given the role that reciprocation plays in liberal states. These 
points highlight the well-known tension between the conception of liberal 
states as cooperative schemes in which persons reciprocate and the limits 
of such conceptions given liberal theories of legitimate authority. This 
tension is often focused upon the line between the state’s authority to 
compel one in one’s individual capacity to help another and the state’s 
authority to address the broader principles of justice that affect general 
welfare on an institutional level. 
The upshot is a presumption of reciprocation in liberal states that gives 
rise to difficult line-drawing exercises with respect to legitimate and 
illegitimate regulations. A principled way to evaluate the legitimacy of 
Bad Samaritan Laws is to answer two related questions: (1) On what 
ground does a state have the authority to dictate that one’s needs should 
be met in the way specified by a particular legal duty? (2) Does a special 
relationship exist that authorizes the establishment of such legal duties? 
This Article has sketched answers to those questions, leading to the 
conclusion that paternalist and moralistic laws—including Bad Samaritan 
laws—are sometimes justified and certainly not ruled out in liberal states. 
However, they are limited based upon a variety of grounds, including 
those that are analogous to the ways in which states might achieve 
legitimate, limited authority. 
 
 91. HUNT, supra note 72, at 88 (discussing how freedom-limiting aspects of the state may 
in fact be a means of protecting freedom, as with Kant’s idea of the state’s role of “a hindering of 
a hindrance to freedom”). 
